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The Saskatchewan Government's 
Internai Arrangements to Accomodate 
Collective Bargaining 
Kurt Wetzel 
and 
Daniel G. Gallagher 
This study looks at three models employée! by Saskat-
chewan's provincial public sector management to facilitate 
bargaining. First is a relatively conventional adaptation to 
bargaining with provincial civil servants. In the second, associa-
tions ofnursing homes and hospitals bargain in the présence ofa 
government observer. The third has the government and school 
trustées, with government holding the balance of power, 
negotiating jointly with the teachers. The paper also discusses 
the central coordination and control functions which the govern-
ment has developed to deal with bargaining. 
The Saskatchewan Trade Union Act neither excludes public employers 
nor provides them the luxury of spécial treatment**. In view of this lack of 
légal differentiation, but recognizing that public employers face problems 
that are différent from private employers', this paper assesses the Saskat-
chewan government's attempts to structure bargaining and field crédible, 
* WETZEL, Kurt, Associate Professor, Collège of Commerce, University of Saskat-
chewan, Saskatoon, Sask. 
GALLAGHER, Daniel G., Assistant Professor, Industrial Relations Institute, Univer-
sity of Iowa, U.S.A. 
** The authors would like to thank the Saskatchewan Law Foundation for the grant 
which made this study possible. 
*** While the teachers are covered under spécial législation and the acts governing police 
and fire fighters contain voluntary interest arbitration provisions which augment the Trade 
Union Act, no group is denied bargaining rights or the right to strike. The Trade Union Act of 
1972, Statutes of Saskatchewan, Ch. 137 (1971-72); The Teachers Collective Bargaining Act of 
1973, Statutes of Saskatchewan, Ch. 112 (1973); The Education Act of 1978, Queen's Printer, 
Regina (1978); The Fire Departments Platoons Act, Revised Statutes of Saskatchewan, Ch. 
173 (1965), am. Statutes of Saskatchewan, Ch. 39 (1973); The Police Act of 1974, Statutes of 
Saskatchewan, Ch. 77 (1973-74). 
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reliable management représentatives in such a fashion that meaningful 
bargaining can occur at the tables. It also analyzes the control and coor-
dination function which this multi-bargaining unit employer, the govern-
ment, has developed to minimize the likelihood of wide disparity develop-
ing among settlements in various bargaining units. 
In attempting to fulfill its responsibilities as keeper of the public purse 
and an employer with the duty to bargain in good faith, the provincial 
government has adhered to the principle that elected officiais and operating 
officers should avoid direct issue involvement in negotiations. Since key 
cabinet ministers, as budget makers, are frequently the ultimate manage-
ment décision makers, they can be objects of union pressure to persuade 
them to improve management offers or even to participate in actual 
negotiations. If the government's officially designated negotiators are suc-
cessfully circumvented with any regularity, their credibility along with that 
of formai collective bargaining is likely to be severely undermined. As a 
group, elected officiais are not likely to be extremely sophisticated in deal-
ing with labour relations matters. Even if they were, neither ministers nor 
their deputies are apt to be able to allocate sufficient time from their 
primary responsibilities to allow negotiations to run a full normal course1. 
Moreover, the impact of a change of government upon a bargaining rela-
tionship would resuit in unnecessary discontinuity if elected officiais were 
direct participants at the bargaining table. Although they may bear ultimate 
responsibility for labour relations, top government officiais are, on 
average, less than idéal bargaining spokesmen for government. 
The employée relations goals of Saskatchewan's New Démocratie Par-
ty (NDP) government of the 1970's hâve been threefold. First, within 
budgetary limitations, it has sought to be a good employer, providing its 
employées with équitable and satisfying settlements. The government's 
methods of and success in achieving its equity goals are beyond the scope of 
this study. Second, it seeks to maintain and strengthen the credibility of the 
formai bargaining process in order that the heat generated in negotiations 
be confined as much as possible to the table and not be directed toward 
cabinet. Effective public sector bargaining minimizes the influence of 
political considérations in determining bargaining outeomes, relying instead 
upon good faith negotiations to establish the terms and conditions of 
employment. To reduce a union's temptation to try to involve elected of-
i SHAW, Lee C , and R. Théodore CLARK, "The Practical Différences Between 
Public and Private Sector Collective Bargaining", UCLA Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 6, August 
1972, pp. 867-886. 
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ficials by approaching members of cabinet directly (i.e. "end running" the 
table), bargaining must be structured in such a way that unions are convinc-
ed either that effective décision making rests at the table or that the best 
means of communicating with the "real" décision makers is through the 
formai bargaining process. Under such arrangements, the negotiator's rôle 
assumes considérable importance. The government must therefore hâve 
confidence that its negotiators comprehend and can protect government's 
interests as well as develop rapport with the unions. Third, government at-
tempts to ensure that there is a flow of information between it and its 
spokesmen and that there is an élément of coordination among its bargain-
ing tables. The aim in this case is that there be a degree of central control 
and a modicum of uniformity in the bargaining outcomes among the 
various provincial tables. In some measure this goal conflicts with govern-
ment's désire to establish the credibility of each bargaining table. One way 
of establishing the credibility of the bargaining process is to vest sufficient 
authority in the negotiators to enable them to reach agreements. Through 
various arrangements, the Saskatchewan government has pursued a 
deliberate policy of ceding décision making authority to its bargaining 
agents. A primary problem in this regard is that of fielding management 
bargaining teams which it trusts with the authority to negotiate agreements. 
Such a team has to reflect both a professional labour relations orientation 
and political acuity and reliability. 
The government's situation is compounded by the fact that it bears the 
direct costs of any one settlement as well as being the employer in the 
"unit(s) of impact". Patterns set at one table can rebound upon other 
public sector relationships. As the largest employer in the province, govern-
ment or quasi-government negotiators deal at central tables with teachers, 
civil servants, employées of health-care institutions, nursing homes, mental 
institutions, crown corporations in addition to numerous small bargaining 
units. In response to this potential problem, the government had found it 
necessary to develop mechanisms for across table coordination of provin-
cial negotiations. 
This paper assesses the Saskatchewan government's efforts to structure 
bargaining in such a fashion that meaningful negotiations can occur at the 
tables. It also discusses the control and coordination function which the 
government has evolved to protect its interests concerning the level of wage 
settlements and concomitant government expenditure levels. For the pur-
pose of this study three broad employment relations and bargaining struc-
tures in the province are examined and contrasted: public service, éducation 
and health services. 
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PUBLIC SERVICE 
Even if it so desired, the government could not place great distance bet-
ween itself and negotiations involving the employées of the provincial civil 
service and mental hospital workers. In the middle f orties, at the outset of 
the bargaining relationship, the government settled upon an internai struc-
ture for dealing with thèse negotiations which has remained fundamentally 
unchanged. Civil service bargaining in Saskatchewan did not commence in 
the larger departments and spread gradually through government. Rather, 
in 1945 the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board made a détermination of 
two appropriate bargaining units for government employées, one covering 
public service employées and the other including employées of the provinces 
mental institutions. A third unit, which was determined in 1948, was com-
prised of seasonal employées who worked primarily for the Highway 
Department and were not covered by the Public Service Act. This unit has 
subsequently been merged (1976) with the public service for purposes of 
bargaining. 
The government's spokesmen in negotiations has been the Saskat-
chewan Public Service Commission (PSC) which received its mandate to 
negotiate on behalf of the government from the Public Service Act, 1945. 
This act, which post-dated the passage of the Trade Union Act, was in large 
measure the CCF (Coopérative Commonwealth Fédération) government's 
response to campaign promises to rationalize and professionalize the pro-
vince's personnel functions, thereby eliminating the pre-existing System 
which was typified by departmental control and political patronage. The 
PSC, a centralized personnel agency, was charged with recruitment, sélec-
tion, classification and bargaining. Centralization of the personnel function 
during the 1940's was convenient and logical if for no other reason than the 
fact that public employment was not large. Furthermore, Saskatchewan 
Government Employées Association (SGEA) favored centralization. The 
unique feature of this personnel System, especially the collective bargaining 
features, is not the fact that it is centralized but that centralization occurred 
at such an early date. 
The long-standing relationship between the Cabinet and PSC is close 
and obvious. Presently the Minister of Finance also serves as the Minister-
In-Charge of the PSC. Bargaining parameters within which PSC 
negotiators must operate are approved by the Cabinet Committee on Col-
lective Bargaining, with final authority residing in Cabinet. The government 
has found little need to become directly involved in negotiations since it can 
safely assume that the PSC comprehends its interests and will see that they 
are protected. The level of trust and comfort which the government feels 
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with this relationship is manifested by the fact that it does not feel the need 
to hâve a non-PSC government représentative to report on the puise and 
direction of talks as it does where the immédiate employer is outside of 
government e.g. hospitals and nursing homes. Aside from an occasional 
direct communication between the Minister-In-Charge and the unions, the 
unions expect to deal with the PSC, as the government's spokesmen. 
The bargaining problems which exist in thèse relationships appear to be 
less a function of the way government has structured itself than the unions' 
internai structure, size and unity. This is amply demonstrated by con-
trasting the PSC's relationship with the smaller CUPE #600 which 
represents mental hospital employées with the large, heterogeneous SGEA. 
In CUPE #600, 1425 employées from seven institutions bargain with 
the PSC. At least one quarter of thèse are psychiatrie nurses who share with 
the administration a high level of concern for the quality of patient care. 
There is no great physical and social distance between administrators and 
employées. Work is performed in relatively confined spaces, in close con-
tact and coopération with management. Many of the administrators are 
former members of the bargaining unit, even union officers, and thèse Per-
sonal ties remain. There are also professional ties between nurses and ad-
ministrators through the Psychiatrie Nurses Association. No automatic 
assumption is made that the goals of the union and the administration are in 
conflict. Not only is there a tradition that hospital administrators par-
ticipate in cantral negotiations but there is also a tradition of autonomy for 
institutions which has meant that the branches of CUPE#600 bargain local-
ly especially over how the master agreement should be applied. At no two 
institutions are the work days of identical length. Since the différent oc-
cupational groups within an institution corne into contact with each other, 
there is a degree of mutual awareness of the contribution made by others 
arid the interdependence of jobs. The resuit is a relatively disciplined and 
cohesive organization which can arrange internai compromises when it is 
establishing bargaining priorities. Since the union's intra-organization 
bargaining problems are usually resolved before it cornes to the table, it is 
not particularly difficult for CUPE #600 and the PSC to get éown to serious 
bargaining. 
In contrast to the PSC-CUPE #600 bargaining relationship, the PSC-
SGEA relationship is cumbersome and, from time to time, rocky. Unlike 
the smaller, cohesive CUPE local, SGEA in the public service is typified by 
heterogeneity of its membership' work and working conditions, its substan-
tial size and a lack of internai consensus, ail of which compound the dif-
ficulties associated with establishing bargaining priorities and reaching 
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compromises. The public service unit includes 15,700 employées spread 
throughout the province and working within a myriad of decentralized 
organizational entities which are charged with carrying out a variety of 
organizational missions. 
SGEA has endeavored to adjust its structure to meet its internai pro-
blems. Recognizing that there is an array of occupations, the skill level and 
numerical strength of which vary, it has gone to two tier bargaining. Ten oc-
cupational groups meet separately with PSC bargainers on issues relevant to 
each group and jointly with the PSC on common issues. There are 20 
geographical régions within which local meetings are held and grievances 
are filed. 
There remains the problem that bargaining is protracted and 
frustrating due in some measure to the great number and variety of issues 
which are presented. None of this is to suggest that SGEA's internai pro-
blems and lack of discipline are pathological, for they could be expected in 
any large, pluralistic and démocratie union. Rather it does appear that the 
more identifiable problems which are manifested in this relationship can in 
some measure be attributed to SGEA's internai difficulties and not the cur-
rent management structure. As long as this is the case, management will not 
hâve a strong incentive to adjust its structure. 
HEALTH SERVICES 
In the health services field, the government has encouraged hospitals 
and nursing homes to assign their bargaining rights to two non-
governmental provincial industry associations. The Saskatchewan Health-
Care Association (SHA) represents the province's 107 organized hospitals 
in bargaining, a responsibility it has carried out since 1973. Of the provinces 
133 hospitals, ail those employing more than 15-20 workers are organized. 
The Saskatchewan Association of Spécial Care Homes (SASCH) negotiates 
for 38 of its 110 member nursing homes, a function it began in 1975. Both 
associations existed prior to the centralization of bargaining. SHA has 
developed a sizeable, professionally qualified labour relations staff, which 
it shares on a fee-for-service basis with its sister organization SASCH. SHA 
receives direct government subsidies designated to defray the costs of 
negotiating and administering province-wide agreements. 
The SHA bargains at separate central tables with the Saskatchewan 
Union of Nurses (SUN), representing 3000 registered nurses; Service 
Employées International Union (SEIU), representing 2000 employées and 
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the Canadian Union of Public Employées (CUPE), representing 4000 
employées. It also conducts negotiations with three other unions represen-
ting smaller units. 
The SHA's bargaining committees are drawn from its labour relations 
committee and include hospital board trustées, hospital administrators and 
SHA labour relations consultants. Présent at both hospital and nursing 
home tables, but not attached to either the union or management teams is 
the government observer. He represents the funding agencies, the Depart-
ments of Health and Social Services. Comprehensive agreements with the 
unions are negotiated centrally although a very limited amount of local 
bargaining does occur. When a seulement is reached, it is submitted to the 
SHA's labour relations committee which recommends it to the SHA board 
of directors. The board submits it to the Saskatchewan Health Services Plan 
(SHSP) in the Department of Health which has the power to authorize fun-
ding for the agreement. When funding is secured, the agreement goes to the 
individual hospital boards which can accept, reject or amend it. Since any 
amendment which exceeds the level which SHSP has agreed to fund must be 
covered by the local hospital itself usually through increased municipal 
taxes, and rejection of the agreement means that the hospital must negotiate 
its own agreement without SHA assistance, unamended ratifications hâve 
been the norm. 
SASCH bargains with SEIU and CUPE at separate central tables, a 
practice begun when coalition bargaining ceased in 1978. Its negotiating 
teams include trustées, administrators, a director of nursing and the SHA 
labour relations consultant. When an agreement is concluded, it is taken to 
the labour relations committee and subsequently the executive board for ap-
proval. It is not submitted to the Department of Social Services for funding 
approval as the SHA does with its agreements. The différence hère stems 
from the fact that virtually ail hospital costs are borne by the provincial 
government while nursing home résidents receive government assistance 
covering from 20-30% to 100% of their costs, depending upon the level of 
care required and the résident's ability to pay. SASCH has more flexibility 
than SHA because it has sizeable extragovernmental funding sources. The 
individual homes ratify, reject or amend the recommended settlement. As 
with the hospitals, local bargaining is negligible. 
By the nature of the structures which hâve been created, it would ap-
pear that the government is anxious to avoid direct participation in thèse 
bargaining relationships. By placing distance between itself and the negotia-
tions, or at least developing a form of involvement which is minimal and 
even vague, the government endeavors to reduce its vulnerability to direct 
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pressure from unions for bargaining concessions. Apparently, the govern-
ment would like to maintain and enhance the credibility of the bargaining 
tables, ideally to the point where any union ire or frustration generated dur-
ing negotiations would be directed at SHA or SASCH rather than cabinet or 
the party in power. Thus SHA and SASCH serve as agents for their consti-
tuencies and buffers for the government. In the latter function they act to 
confine bargaining as much as possible to the table and to bring in political-
ly acceptable settlements. 
The associations are anxious to retain the authority to conduct negotia-
tions and to absorb the resulting heat. The more successful they are at 
dispelling any doubts which the unions may hold as to whether the associa-
tions wield sufficient power to direct their own labour relations, the 
stronger their credibility with the union becomes. Furthermore, if they 
manage the labour relations function capably and prudently, the associa-
tions stand to gain government's trust and with that more freedom from in-
terférence. The directors of health services institutions appear convinced 
that the associations, rather than government, are able to bargain collective 
agreements which more closely approximate the institutions' needs. They 
find the présent arrangement vastly more préférable to having government 
conduct bargaining on their behalf. 
Both associations seem to believe that maximum freedom from govern-
ment interférence can be attained by demonstrating that they can be trusted 
to evolve reasonably stable relationships with the unions and produce pru-
dent settlements. In this regard, SASCH and the SHA hâve différent em-
phases. SASCH is more conservative, probably reflecting a rural bias and a 
tendency to be more heavily influenced by local trustées than professional 
administrators. Its reluctance to yield quickly on monetary issues reflects 
the above orientations plus a désire not to sharply increase charges to pay-
ing résidents. Thus SASCH tends to keep a tighter hold on the purse strings 
than SHA. The SHA's labour relations hâve a différent orientation, reflec-
ting the fact that SHA is heavily influenced by administrators and larger, 
urban hospitals. Since patients are not charged directly, SHA has only to 
satisfy the government and its membership in bargaining. It, more than 
SASCH, is concerned with bringing in settlements that government will find 
reasonable enough to fund. SHA is the wage leader and SASCH tends to be 
a somewhat reluctant follower. 
Despite its restricted participation in the bargaining process and the 
nature of the certification orders, the government's interest in the outcomes 
of bargaining, due to its rôle in funding agreements, is such that it could be 
argued that government is in fact the ultimate employer, at least in the 
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hospital field. It picks up the entire hospital wage bill, some $170 million in 
1977, and a good share of it in nursing homes. Not only must government 
approve the funding of hospital settlements but it must feed information to 
the SHA's bargaining teams so that they know what their parameters are. 
The usual problem in this regard is that of the "ghost" at the bargaining 
table, i.e. the unseen but real décision making party who establishes 
budgetary priorities. In the case of the health services industry the govern-
ment has attempted to circumvent this problem with a unique approach. 
The ghost is directly represented by the government observer. 
As it has evolved the government observer's rôle has proven a 
multifaceted, intricate one. Originally, the observer was to be a resource 
person for both parties since he enjoyed access to objective government 
data on health services opérations. Furthermore, he was to be the govern-
ment's eyes and ears at the table, keeping it informed as to what could be 
expected in terms of settlements while making certain that the government's 
interests were being adequately protected. This roughly approximates the 
rôles he plays in nursing home negotiations, albeit he is asked more ques-
tions by management than union bargainers. The rôle has expanded con-
siderably beyond that in hospital bargaining. 
Not only does he report progress at the SHA tables, but he supplies in-
formation to them. The SHA team does not know precisely how much 
money is available, so the observer provides go-no go signais which are tan-
tamount to indicating that the government will fund particular proposais. 
The real advantage of this arrangement is its speed. Management is not 
placed in the position having to adjourn for consultations with the funding 
agency. By avoiding such delays, management spokesmen are less likely to 
lose face because they do no know the exact parameters within which they 
are working. While government makes funding décision, bargaining is 
structured so that power to settle or take a strike résides at the table. 
While the observer is an information conduit between the table and the 
funding agency, he is also the médium through which the SHA bargaining 
team negotiates with the government to secure funding for positions it 
deems necessary to get settlements. There is, however, the understanding 
between management représentatives and the government that management 
must never blâme the government when SHSP takes a firm stand and 
refuses to expand SHA's parameters. At this point the association is ex-
pected to absorb the heat. 
It is noteworthy that at the table the observer does not speak unless he 
is either asked a direct question or the government cornes under direct at-
tack. There is some évidence that he serves as a moderating influence on the 
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more extrême tendencies of both table parties. No one wants to appear to be 
unreasonable in the eyes of the observer. Furthermore, depending upon the 
union and how negotiations hâve proceeded, he plays a conciliation rôle. 
Although the observer sits with the management team, coming and going 
with them in addition to attending meetings of SHA's labour relations com-
mittee and working directly for SHSP's negotiations branch, he will visit 
union caucuses, either invited or uninvited. Sometimes he will be asked to 
leave but frequently his ouvertures are accepted. The observer can facilitate 
communications among the parties and the government. A union may feel 
that the government's position is the problem and will ask him to relay cer-
tain information to top officiais in the Departments of Health, Social Ser-
vices or Finance. It may be easier for a union team to lay its final position 
before the observer than its bargaining opposite. This conciliation rôle 
becomes more évident when the parties are closing and hard décisions are 
being made. He is often in a position to help ameliorate problems which 
resuit from misunder standings, inadéquate communications or either party 
taking "unreasonable" stands. 
Having watched the talks unfold and sensing the tone of the discus-
sions, he may find himself in the position of explaining to top government 
officiais concerned with budgetary implications of a settlement that the 
management team got the best possible deal under the circumstances and 
that it should be funded. Thus he may end up selling an agreement to the 
government. 
To perform effectively in this capacity, the observer must be trusted by 
management, government and the unions. The job also requires a 
sophisticated understanding of the pressures upon each and how the 
bargaining process works. It may well be that the current observer's 
background and personality hâve served to make him effective while the 
position is an impossible one. From the inter- and intra-organizational 
perspective, the rôle of the observer is an interesting adaptation to the 
health services bargaining environment. 
EDUCATION 
In contrast to the Saskatchewan government's successful attempts to 
structure public sector bargaining in a manner which avoids direct par-
ticipation by immédiate représentatives of the elected government, e.g. the 
entire health services field, bargaining in the area of elementary and secon-
dary éducation represents a third or hybrid operational structure. 
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With the exception of a few local issues, bargaining in éducation over 
major économie issues occurs at the provincial level. In contrast to health 
services bargaining, the movement to province-wide bargaining has not 
been the resuit of a voluntary évolution. Rather province-wide bargaining 
was mandated by the Teachers Collective Bargaining Act of 1973. Prior to 
that bargaining had existed under two other structural arrangements. From 
1949, the date the Teachers' Salary Negotiation Act was passed, until 1968 
bargaining was conducted at the local school district level and involved the 
Saskatchewan Teachers Fédération (STF) local and local school board 
trustées. Local bargaining resulted in considérable diversity in negotiated 
wage rates and related conditions of employment among school districts. 
The différences in bargaining outeomes were most évident when urban and 
rural school districts were compared. 
In an effort to strike a balance between the STF's désire for a rnore cen-
tralized and hence a single province-wide salary structure and the school 
trustées who sought both to minimize the impact of the fractionalized 
bargaining structure and to retain educational décision making near the 
local level, the Teachers Salary Agreement Act of 1968 was enacted under 
the Libéral government. This législation divided the province into thirteen 
areas for bargaining purposes. Within each area, représentatives of STF 
locals and school district trustées negotiated at a single table to establish a 
salary and benefit structure for the area. 
Dissatisfied with the area structure, the STF continued to pressure the 
government to restructure bargaining into a single province-wide System. 
The STF's push for centralized bargaining was predicated on the knowledge 
that the provincial government was assuming a greater décision making rôle 
in bargaining because an increasing percentage of educational costs were be-
ing underwritten with provincial funds. The STF also believed that area-
wide bargaining had been hindered by the Libéral government's restraint 
policies which limited budget growth and wage changes. The STF concluded 
that if the government was going to be more active in funding décisions af-
fecting the économies of bargaining, then its représentatives should défend 
those interests directly at a single centralized bargaining table. As the situa-
tion existed in 1971 when the NDP came to power, the Saskatchewan 
School Trustées Association and STF, as central loci of power, were 
bargaining at a distance thus giving bargaining an aura of artficiality. Ap-
parently the government found this unacceptable. 
In a response to its desires to establish salary equity throughout the 
province, as well as to keep a degree of control over the level of educational 
spending, in 1972 the NDP government proposed a bargaining structure 
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which involved the STF and the SSTA negotiating a province-wide agree-
ment, with the government operating in an observer capacity as in health 
services. The government's plan to establish a centralized bargaining 
System, which would end disparity in salaries and facilitate centralized cost 
control while permitting the government to avoid direct participation in 
bargaining, was destroyed when the SSTA announced its opposition to the 
concept of centralized bargaining. 
The SSTA's opposition to centralization was based on the conviction 
that décision making in éducation should remain close to the local level3. 
This position reflects the thinking of the rural membership, the dominant 
group in the SSTA. The trustées were also apprehensive about the increased 
bargaining power the teachers would enjoy as a resuit of centralization, 
especially the prospect of a province-wide strike. 
The SSTA's attitude presented a paradox for the provincial govern-
ment. In a fiscal sensé the SSTA was reliable since its primary concerns were 
with minimizing the level of educational spending within the school 
districts, particularly the level of local taxation needed to support such 
spending. However, enactment of législation forcing the SSTA to bargain 
with the STF at a central table was unfeasible. The SSTA had openly 
criticized the proposed structure, predicting that such a System would fail. 
Any such législation might hâve interfered with the government's achieving 
the goal of promoting a positive industrial relations environment. The 
government was also confronted with the issue of credibility at the bargain-
ing table. The STF had urged centralized bargaining with the condition that 
the government would be directly involved in negotiations. If centralized 
bargaining were to succeed, the STF believed that the government would 
hâve to be at the table since it was assuming a greater rôle in funding éduca-
tion expenditures. The STF warned the government that its bargaining team 
would hâve severe credibility problems, if bargaining were delegated ex-
clusively to the SSTA. At the time the government could afford to alienate 
the politically ineffectuai SSTA but it did not want to risk unnecessarily 
alienating the politically well-connected STF, which boasted a politically 
astute and homogeneous membership of over 11,000 spread throughout the 
province. Faced with this political reality and the problem of fielding 
reliable and crédible représentatives, while maintaining some distance bet-
ween Cabinet and the negotiations, a compromise, establishing a unique 
hybrid structure, was made. 
a It is noteworthy that collective bargaining involving non-teaching employées occurs at 
the local school district level. 
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In 1973 the Législature passed the Teachers Collective Bargaining Act. 
This law replaced the area-wide System with a centralized structure. The 
STF would represent the teachers, while stewardship of the employer's in-
terests was shared by the SSTA and government représentatives. The 
management bargaining committee was to consist of nine members, four 
appointed by the SSTA and five named by the government. Four of the five 
government représentatives hâve been staff représentatives from the 
Department of Education, with the fifth coming from the Department of 
Finance. Initially, the Department of Education staffers were assigned to 
negotiations on a part-time basis, but in an effort to improve the manage-
ment team's professionalism a number of the Department's staff were 
assigned to full time labor relations duties. 
Under this hybrid structure the government's représentatives hâve the 
controlling vote in regard to policy and position formulation. The major 
function of the government représentatives has been to protect the interests 
of elected government as well as to accommodate the interests of the SSTA 
who represent the immédiate employers. The government's major concern 
is with the économie cost of settlements. Currently the government pays in 
the range of 30-85% of the local operating costs of school districts, so any 
significant bargaining concessions would likely require the government to 
substantially increase its spending. Furthermore a substantial part of the 
costs of such bargaining items as superannuation are paid by the govern-
ment. The Department of Education représentatives also play a major rôle 
by assisting the SSTA to protect their concerns regarding the operational 
implications of any agreement. 
In practice the hybrid management team structure has necessitated con-
sidérable prebargaining coordination. Prior to negotiations the SSTA's 
positions are determined by its 20 member collective bargaining committee, 
from which its four représentatives are selected. Thèse positions must be ap-
proved by the SSTA Executive Committee. Similar to the public service 
model, the parameters for the government représentatives are established by 
consent of the Cabinet Committee on Collective Bargaining with approval 
of the full Cabinet. Once the guidelines hâve been set for the component 
parts of the management team, a considérable amount of intraorganiza-
tional bargaining occurs between the government and SSTA représen-
tatives. Although the government représentatives could control the outcome 
of the prebargaining strategy sessions, they hâve been particularly reluctant 
to décide ail issues by means of their majority status. The prebargaining ses-
sions involve substantial compromise. The Department of Education is will-
ing to compromise with the SSTA because the government wants to avoid 
aggravating the SSTA's dissatisfaction by excessive unilatéral décision mak-
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ing. If this hybrid structure is to be effective, each party must feel that its 
concerns are being recognized. By displaying insensitivity to the SSTA's 
concerns, government représentatives would risk the possibility of the 
SSTA renewing its public opposition to the centralized bargaining and iden-
tifying the government représentatives as the primary décision makers at 
whom the STF should direct its efforts. 
An interesting aspect of this hybrid structure is the willingness of the 
SSTA to absorb a great deal of the heat generated in bargaining. The SSTA 
has generally been reluctant to blâme the government publicly for un-
popular outcomes. Rather than place responsibility upon the government's 
agents, the SSTA has accepted union criticisms that the SSTA's présence 
complicates bargaining. In doing so, the SSTA has attempted to indicate to 
the STF that it plays a crédible rôle in the process despite its minority status. 
For the government, the hybrid structure serves as a dual buffer from 
direct pressure by the union. The effectiveness of "end runs" to deal direct-
ly with the elected officiais has been limited because government has 
delegated considérable décision making authority to the Department of 
Education bargaining représentatives. This has enabled them to negotiate 
without continued referral to the Cabinet Committee thereby minimizing 
the visibility of the government's rôle. In addition the présence of the SSTA 
at the table allows the government to respond to overtures for direct in-
volvement by indicating that bargaining must occur at the table with the 
participation of the SSTA. The government's préférence for maintaining its 
distance from negotiations has been largely accommodated. 
Although the SSTA has ceased its vocal opposition to the current struc-
ture, it still harbors hopes of returning bargaining to a more localized form. 
It has also begun to advocate changing the législation to grant the SSTA 
unilatéral control of the management side of the table. Despite the SSTA's 
efforts to convince the government that the SSTA can now be viewed as a 
reliable représentative of the government's interests, the prospect of the 
government turning control of bargaining exclusively to the SSTA is unlike-
ly. In the first place the government is reluctant to do so because the STF 
has long advocated the necessity of having the government represented at 
the bargaining table and is unlikely to allow government représentatives to 
withdraw without considérable political opposition. Second, the govern-
ment has found that the protection provided by the dual buffers under this 
hybrid arrangement has served its interests reasonably well. Removal of 
Department of Education représentatives might prompt the STF to attempt 
to circumvent the bargaining table and deal directly with the government. 
By maintaining the current structure the government is better able to 
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oversee bargaining without becoming directly involved in negotiations. 
Since the government has committed itself to inserting relatively immédiate 
représentatives into the negotiations, it is difficult to terminate that involve-
ment. 
COORDINATION AND CONTROL FUNCTION 
The government appears to be keenly aware of the direct budgetary im-
plications which particular wage settlements can hâve, as well as their possi-
ble impact upon the terms of other settlements. As the province's largest 
employer, the patterns, which key provincial government settlements can 
generate, are difficult for those at other public sector tables to resist. The 
government has recognized the need to coordinate its bargaining to avoid 
being swamped by the wake of one of its own unexpectedly high set-
tlements. The government also seeks to avoid creating problems for 
employers with less ability to pay, especially the municipalities. 
In the Department of Finance's Bureau of Management Improvement 
there is a Personnel Policy Unit which is charged with coordinating provin-
cial bargaining and keeping the Cabinet Committee on Collective Bargain-
ing informed. Included in its mandate are crown corporations, éducation, 
health services, the public service and various boards and commissions. The 
Personnel Policy Unit makes regular submissions to Cabinet Committee. 
Since its task has strong political overtones, an attempt is made to keep its 
opérations as unobtrusive as possible. In fact, the group's rôle is not clearly 
understood by those outside government, although some such coordinating 
or control function is widely and vaguely rumored. 
By analyzing régional public and industrial patterns, the political en-
vironment, gênerai économie conditions and holding pre-bargaining con-
férences for the government's various bargaining représentatives to gather 
assessments of union expectations and probable seulement ranges, the Per-
sonnel Policy Unit attempts to ascertain what gênerai wage increase figures 
are likely to be required to conclude agreements. Although cognizant of the 
bargainers' needs to maintain flexibility, the possible ramifications of a par-
ticular "out of Une" seulement is probably a greater concern at this level. 
One might assume with the large number of settlements in the 1978-79 
round of negotiations which came in at 7 1 l2°ïo and 6% increases over the 
two years, that the central coordinating rôle is important in affecting 
bargaining outeomes. The existence of this type of function carries with it 
certain risks for the government because évidence of strong central input of 
this type may cause and in fact has caused some to question whether 
bargaining of monetary issues at individual tables in "real". 
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In addition to facilitating regular vertical communication and the ex-
change of information among bargaining tables, représentatives of the Per-
sonnel Policy Unit may become involved in relationships if problems occur 
during negotiations. A unit représentative may direct discrète inquiries to 
union leaders to ascertain what the true nature of a problem is and what 
might be needed to résolve it. Thus, the government can avail itself of an 
additional means of communication which does not directly involve 
ministers. 
In 1976 during the period of provincial wage controls, the public sector 
unions responded to the government's overt policy of central control by for-
ming a common front under the auspices of the Sasketchewan Fédération of 
Labour. No formai structure emerged, no power was ceded to a central 
body to control or coordinate the front members' bargaining and no com-
mon positions or goals were agreed upon. The front has confined its ac-
tivities to exchanging information on bargaining positions and exchanging 
assurances of mutual support. However, the very fact of the front's 
establishment and marginal continued existence is a manifestation of the 
conviction among a number of public sector unions that the government 
tends to bargain with public employées as if they represented a single collec-
tivity, employed by différent branches of government. It remains to be seen 
whether this nascent response to central control will become a power for the 
government to reckon with. 
Another aspect of the government's involvement in central coordina-
tion relates to provincial boards and commissions which are certified 
bargaining units. They do not corne under the control of the Public Service 
Commission. Thèse units include larger ones like the Liquor Board (394 
employées) and Workers' Compensation Board (175 employées), the six 
community collèges (12-39 employées) and smaller units such as the Arts 
Board and Welfare Rights Centre Board (9 employées each). The larger 
units hâve expérience with and expertise in bargaining. However, manage-
ment of the smaller units tends to be highly program oriented, frequently 
lacking both a deep understanding of dynamics of bargaining and the possi-
ble implications of some things which they might agrée to, especially as they 
might affect other units. 
SGEA has purportedly found thèse units useful for winning conces-
sions which it has been unable to obtain from the PSC. Armed with such a 
breakthrough, it has argued for similar benefits for the larger public service 
group. To reduce the threat of this happening, management of the smaller 
boards and commissions hâve been urged to seek bargaining assistance 
from the PSC. In certain cases this has resulted in PSC negotiators taking 
over talks, even though thèse units are officially beyond the PSC s purview. 
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The PSC evidently hopes that if SGEA représentatives hear the same 
arguments from the same people at différent tables, SGEA will conclude 
that its is unlikely to break new ground with the small units and hence be 
willing to centralize thèse talks to save staff time and money. This would 
help ease the government's coordination and control problems. This situa-
tion points up the parties' dilemma. The union claims that each unit should 
be treated as a separate bargaining entity, however, comparability 
arguments are an essential part of their negotiating répertoire. In this case, 
SGEA is driving management to push for more uniformity and central con-
trol in its labour relations. SGEA représentatives hâve acknowledged that 
due to the cost of servicing small units it would be désirable to amalgamate 
some into the main public service agreement. However, thèse agreements 
tend to be marginally better, purportedly to compensate for reduced mobili-
ty and promotional opportunities. Therefore, it is difficult to convince 
members of small units to coalesce. As long as the provincial government 
bargains separately with a wide assortment of unions and bargaining units, 
the central coordination and control function will remain an ingrédient of 
the government's internai structure. 
CONCLUSION 
To varying degrees, the Saskatchewan government has managed to 
divest itself of direct bargaining rôles, assured that its legitimate interests 
will be adequately protected. Government has also built in an élément of 
coordination which promotes stability for the entire System without impos-
ing rigid uniformities upon it. Adjustments in the relative wages within and 
among the major bargaining groups can be and are made without upsetting 
the entire System. Having been reasonably satisfied with the System during 
récent bargaining round, there are no signs that the government wants any 
drastic change. The only disaffected "management" group is the relatively 
weak SSTA. Department officiais hâve shown no inclination to assume 
bargaining responsibilities from the PSC. SASCH and SHA, which hâve so 
far managed to gain the confidence of both the government and their con-
stituencies, are eager to maintain the existing arrangements. 
Rumblings of discontent can be heard from within the trade union 
movement about the way government has structured itself to bargain. 
However, either this dissatisfaction has not yet been sufficiently focused or 
the discontent is not widespread or profound enough to provoke concerted 
action by public sector unions designed to bring about fundamental altéra-
tions. Despite the fact that the employer is ultimately the same in each case, 
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the flexibility that the System confers upon individual unions is evidently 
valued. Consensus among public sector unions to move to a more centraliz-
ed System of bargaining or political confrontations through a united front 
does not appear to be in the immédiate offing. The management structure 
seems to be at a period of temporary equilibrium. 
Les négociations dans les secteurs public 
et parapublic en Saskatchewan 
L'article ci-dessus analyse les adaptations qui ont été faites par la direction du 
secteur public en Saskatchewan afin de répondre aux exigences de la négociation col-
lective. Cette étude s'étend aux employés des institutions psychiatriques, des hôpi-
taux et des centres d'accueil ainsi qu'aux enseignants et aux fonctionnaires. Sauf en 
ce qui a trait aux enseignants de niveau primaire et secondaire, les salaires du secteur 
public relèvent du Saskatchewan Union Act, loi qui s'applique aussi à ceux du 
secteur privé. Tous les groupes d'employés du secteur public jouissent du droit de 
négociation collective et du droit de grève. Dans chacun des cas, la négociation est 
centralisée au niveau de la province. 
Aussi, le gouvernement s'est-il efforcé de s'y impliquer en y désignant des 
représentants et des cadres supérieurs au moyen d'ententes qui délèguent la respon-
sabilité de négocier à des porte-parole professionnellement qualifiés et capables 
d'avoir une bonne compréhension des problèmes des employeurs immédiats. Le plus 
possible, grâce à ces ententes, la négociation est orientée vers des objectifs économi-
ques plutôt que politiques. En même temps, le gouvernement a reconnu explicite-
ment la nécessité qu'il y avait pour lui de participer aux décisions, d'être informé de 
la situation à chaque table de négociation et de coordonner le cheminement suivi et 
les offres soumises en son nom à chacune des tables. 
On relève trois modèles de négociation dans le secteur public en Saskatchewan. 
Le premier consiste en une structure classique où les représentants de la Commission 
de la fonction publique, au nom du gouvernement, négocient séparément avec les 
employés de la fonction publique et des institutions psychiatriques. Dans ce cas, il 
s'agit, en droit et en fait, des relations entre l'État et ses employés propres et aucune 
tentative n'a d'ailleurs été faite pour éloigner le gouvernement de la négociation. 
Le deuxième modèle qu'on retrouve dans les hôpitaux et les centres d'accueil est 
caractérisé par l'existence d'associations parapubliques (Saskatchewan Health Care 
Association et Saskatchewan Association of Spécial Care Homes) qui négocient au 
nom d'institutions totalement ou partiellement subventionnées par l'État. Le trait 
fondamental et unique de ce modèle est le fait que le gouvernement y est représenté 
par un observateur qui joue divers rôles. L'observateur du gouvernement fournit de 
la documentation à l'équipe des négociateurs et indique si l'État est disposé à faire 
certaines propositions spécifiques; il tient le gouvernement informé du pouls des 
négociations, lui transmet les messages des deux parties lorsque demande lui en est 
faite; il s'efforce d'apprécier les possibilités d'accord tout en agissant comme média-
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teur entre les parties. Toutefois, il ne fait pas de doute que ce sont les associations 
d'employeurs et les syndicats qui ont la responsabilité de négocier et de ratifier les 
conventions collectives. 
Le troisième modèle est le système hybride que l'on trouve dans le secteur de 
l'enseignement. Dans ce cas, l'État, par l'intermédiaire de porte-parole désignés par 
le ministère de l'Éducation, et l'Association des commissions scolaires (Association 
ofSchool Trustées) sont l'un et l'autre représentés à la table de négociation face à la 
Fédération des enseignants de la Saskatchewan (Saskatchewan Teachers' 
Fédération). Le Teachers Collective Act de 1973 stipule en effet que le gouvernement 
a droit de nommer cinq membres de l'équipe patronale et l'Association, les quatre 
autres. Cette disposition résulte de l'opposition de l'Association patronale à des 
négociations à l'échelon de la province pour les enseignants de niveau primaire et 
secondaire. Parce que les commissions scolaires soutenaient que le secteur de l'édu-
cation devait être contrôlé au plan local, le gouvernement, craignant que l'Associa-
tion ne soit pas assez motivée pour réussir dans des négociations provinciales, s'est 
donné la majorité dans l'équipe des négociateurs. Cependant, résultat du désir du 
gouvernement de donner à l'Association la possibilité de jouer un rôle valable dans le 
processus de négociation, ce système est caractérisé par nombre de pourparlers in-
ternes. Cette structure plaît à la Fédération des enseignants qui tenait beaucoup à ce 
que le gouvernement soit représenté à la table des négociations, car de 55 à 30 pour 
cent du budget de chaque commission scolaire provient de subventions de lÉtat. 
Le gouvernement s'est montré fort conscient de la nécessité d'une coordination 
et d'un contrôle au sommet afin d'éviter qu'un secteur donné négocie des conditions 
qui pourraient avoir un impact indésirable ailleurs. Le Bureau de perfectionnement 
de l'Administration du ministère des Finances a assigné à son groupe de la gestion du 
personnel la tâche de coordonner les négociations aux nombreuses tables de négo-
ciation provinciale. Ce groupe est aussi chargé d'informer le Comité du cabinet sur 
les négociations collectives. Il étudie les tendances des négociations au niveau 
régional public et dans l'industrie, le climat politique, les conditions économiques 
générales; il tient des conférences avant les négociations pour s'efforcer de connaître 
ce qu'attendent les syndicats et les hypothèses de règlement. Il tente enfin de s'in-
former de l'ampleur des augmentations générales de salaire qui peuvent être exigées 
en vue de la conclusion des conventions collectives. 
